The main objective of Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy is to expand the range, variety and quality of texts in the history of philosophy which are available in English. The series includes texts by familiar names (such as Descartes and Kant) and also by less well-known authors. Wherever possible, texts are published in complete and unabridged form, and translations are specially commissioned for the series. Each volume contains a critical introduction together with a guide to further reading and any necessary glossaries and textual apparatus. The volumes are designed for student use at undergraduate and postgraduate level and will be of interest not only to students of philosophy, but also to a wider audience of readers in the history of science, the history of theology and the history of ideas.
geography, which he offered in the summer of 1756. Kant's Anthropology is thus an important document in the history of this discipline. When he first offered a course explicitly dedicated to anthropology in the winter semester of 1772-3, he had already thought about its contents for some time. On the other hand, there was not much precedent for it, and he had every right to feel like a pioneer.
Kant's conception of anthropology was in many ways rather different from the way it is conceived of today. From the very beginning he viewed it not just as an empirical or descriptive discipline, but also as a useful tool for the moral and cultural improvement of his students. Thus he wrote toward the end of 1773 to his former student Marcus Herz -someone who he knew had a great interest in the subject -that he was offering for the second time a colloquium privatum on anthropology, and that he was planning to transform this subject into a proper academic discipline. This plan was, he said, ''unique,'' for the main purpose of the new course of studies was to introduce the sources of all the sciences that are concerned with morals, with the ability of commerce, and the method of educating and ruling human beings, or all that is practical. In this discipline I will, then, be more concerned to seek out the phenomena and their laws than the first principles of the possibility of modifying human nature itself. (10, p. 145) 1 His goal was twofold: (1) a theoretical investigation of the source of all practical philosophy, its phenomena, and its laws, and (2) a doctrine that was itself practical in teaching the rudiments of prudence, wisdom, or knowledge of the world.
Kant went on to assure Herz that the contents of the course would be enjoyable rather than dry and academic. Drawing an explicit parallel to his lectures on physical geography, he characterized it as an ''observational doctrine'' (Beobachtungslehre) that he intended to develop in such a way that it would serve his students in later life. He also felt it necessary to point out explicitly that he would not address such ''subtle'' but Introduction viii ''eternally futile'' questions or philosophical problems as the mind-body relation. The lectures should be ''popular'' both in the sense that the subject matter was treated ''popularly'' and in the sense that the lectures should attract many students as (paying) customers.
It should also be obvious that the plan for this new academic discipline, concerned with the sources of all that is practical, moral, or has to do with human interaction, is connected with the attempts of other contemporaries in this direction. Indeed, Herz's review of Ernst Platner's newly published Anthropology for Physicians and Philosophers provided the immediate occasion for his remarks in the letter. And there is other evidence which shows how closely he was attuned to the developments having to do with the newly emerging study of anthropological issues, and how he consciously chose a different direction from that taken by his contemporaries.
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It appears by all accounts that he was successful in his attempt to be popular. While his lectures on metaphysics were considered very difficult by most of his students, the lectures on anthropology (like the lecture on physical geography) were among the best attended he ever offered, even though they were not free like the lectures on metaphysics.
3 It is therefore not surprising that Kant felt at the end of his teaching career that the notes for these lectures that he had prepared over the years deserved to be published in their own right as a textbook on which other professors could base their lectures, just as he had relied for so many years on Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's Metaphysica in his lectures on metaphysics and anthropology. He must have taken this decision during the early summer of 1798.
4 Johann Friedrich Abegg, who visited Königsberg in 1798, wrote on June 1 in his travel journal that earlier that morning Kant had corrected his Anthropology, as this work would Introduction now be published as well. We do not know whether these ''corrections'' were revisions of Kant's own manuscript, a version of which is extant in the Library of the University of Rostock, or whether he was working on the proof sheets sent by the printer. It seems likely that it was the former, as Kant was not in the habit of going carefully through the proofs himself.
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Two thousand copies of the Anthropology were printed -more than any of his other works.
6 The book seems to have sold well, for just two years later a second edition appeared. But it was not a critical success. Apart from Friedrich Schleiermacher's entirely negative review in the Athenäum, a journal devoted to the cause of Romanticism and highly critical of many of the ideals of the Enlightenment, there was no discussion.
7 Not surprisingly, Schleiermacher's review was not designed to create a need for such a discussion. It begins as follows: ''A summary of this book could not be much more than a collection of trivial matters. If, on the other hand, it were intended to give a sketch of the plan and its execution . . . it would necessarily give a distinct picture of the most peculiar confusion.'' These claims are not entirely unfair. Kant's Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View is a difficult book, and it is difficult precisely because it reveals a certain tension between particular factual observations and assertions that seem homely and trivial, if not downright false, and somewhat muted suggestions that the whole enterprise is highly significant without a clear indication of what precisely makes it so significant. On the one hand, it is described by Kant as a ''manual'' or Handbuch concerned with the down-to-earth task of providing the rudiments of ''knowledge of the world'' to students in their early teens, the implication being that it is not just based on his own lectures but it could and should be used by other university teachers as the basis for their own lectures on this subject. On the other hand, the book ends with the assertion that the admission that this race of terrestrial rational beings deserve no honorable place among the (to us unknown) other rational beings . . .
[precisely] reveals a moral disposition in us, an innate demand of reason, to also work against this propensity. So it presents the human species not as evil, but as a species of rational being that strives among obstacles to rise out of evil in constant progress toward the good. (6, pp. 332f.) It thus presents itself as a contribution to the political task of the progressive organization of the citizens of the earth, ''united by cosmopolitical bonds,'' and aligns itself with the earlier essays on history and the Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone.
It is this peculiar combination of the homely and the sublime that makes for both the charm and the difficulty of the book. And the question is how Kant can hope to perform in one book two tasks that are ultimately quite different. The Anthropology clearly belongs among the small group of works which were conceived as textbooks for introductory courses given at university level. In this respect it is similar to the Logic, the Physical Geography, and the Pedagogy, which were edited by Benjamin Jäsche and Friedrich Theodor Rink on the basis of Kant's notes. What makes the Anthropology different from those works, however, is that Kant himself edited it; but he clearly had some difficulties in doing so. We may also ask whether a textbook should be measured by the same criteria as an original contribution to philosophical discussion. The first question is answered in metaphysics, the second in morals, the third in religion and the fourth in anthropology. (9, p. 25) Kant then claims that all this can be included within anthropology because the four questions ''relate to anthropology.'' 8 Since the first three questions also appear in the Critique of Pure Reason as a summary of all the ''interests of my reason'' (no matter whether they are speculative or practical), one may indeed argue that the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason need a foundation in a critical anthropology that uncovers the very essence of humans as finite beings and constitutes a fundamental ontology.
9 This has been argued most famously by Martin Heidegger, who claimed that Kant's philosophical enterprise could be summed up as the attempt to lay the ground of metaphysics by revealing its ''inner possibility'' in ''the subjectivity of the human subject.'' Kant's ''question as to the essence of metaphysics is the question concerning the unity of the basic faculties of the human 'mind.' The Kantian groundlaying yields [this conclusion]: the grounding of metaphysics is a questioning with regard to the human being, i.e., Anthropology.''
10 However interesting such a conception of a Kantian anthropology may be in its own right, it is clearly not the one Kant himself envisaged. As we have just seen, his anthropology is an Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, perhaps even an ''Anthropology from a Cosmopolitan Point of View,'' but it is most definitely not an ''Anthropology from an Ontological (or Metaphysical) Point of View.'' Because of this, it does not belong to the very center of Kant's philosophical concerns. It is a ''pragmatic'' enterprise: peripheral, but important for the application of his thought. We can see this also from the characterization of the three questions that make up the question ''What is a human being?'' as questions that are asked ''in the cosmopolitan sense'' of the philosophy, not in a transcendental sense. They are important when we are concerned with the application of philosophical principles, or indeed when we talk about the role or function which philosophical principles can assume in the world. They are not important when we come to talk about the foundation or justification of such philosophical principles. This is not just an argument against the fundamental importance of anthropology to Kant's enterprise; it is also an argument against anyone who would claim that Kant's anthropological considerations are so peripheral that they would not be missed if they had not survived. I would argue that they would be missed in so far as they add a certain dimension to the ''cosmopolitical sense'' of Kant's entire philosophy. Even if the published Anthropology were to express this dimension only imperfectly, it might give significant clues about how we should or should not conceive of it.
As Schleiermacher pointed out, neither the contents nor the overall plan of the book are easily summarized. Kant defines anthropology as ''a doctrine of the knowledge of the human being, systematically formulated,'' and he claims that such a doctrine can take (only?) two forms. It is either physiological or pragmatic. The first ''concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being,'' the second ''the investigation of what he as a free acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself.'' Physical anthropology may be observational or speculative. The latter is absolutely useless, or, as Kant puts it, ''a pure waste of time.'' But even the former is not useful because ''the observer'' must let ''nature run its course'' without being able to change it (7, p. 119). Added to this, both introspection and the observation of others encounter difficulties that are ''inherent in human nature itself'' (7, p. 119). We can observe neither ourselves as we ''really'' are nor others as they ''really'' are because the very act of observing changes the behavior that is observed. Dissimulation and habit interfere. So it is difficult to grasp what human nature actually is, and it is better to concentrate on what humans as free acting beings make of themselves and what they can and should make of themselves. That is the reason why Kant does not want to discuss issues of physical anthropology in the context of a pragmatic anthropology, even though he was very interested in such issues and wrote articles on topics of race and the physical nature of human beings in learned and popular journals.
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The structure of the Anthropology
The work itself is divided into two parts, namely the ''Anthropological Didactic'' and the ''Anthropological Characteristic.'' The first of these parts deals with what Kant would have called ''empirical psychology,'' but it is perhaps better characterized as his ''faculty psychology'' or his classificatory scheme for mental ''phenomena'' as more or less static tendencies and faculties. It consists of three ''books,'' the first of which deals with the ''cognitive faculty,'' i.e., with such things as inner sense, the five external senses, the understanding, the voluntary and involuntary imagination, fantasy, and memory, as well as with many things closely connected with it. One might say that he deals in this book with those matters that form the psychological background of the first Critique. Book II deals with the ''feeling of pleasure and displeasure,'' or with matters related to taste, while Book III is concerned with the ''faculty of desire,'' or with the psychological background of moral philosophy or ethics. Indeed, paragraphs 73-88 must be carefully read by anyone concerned with Kant's moral philosophy, if only because one finds there clear definitions of the psychological vocabulary which is relevant to his moral theory. This first part of the Anthropology seems to be most closely connected with the first origins of the lectures on anthropology, since Kant first conceived of anthropology as a replacement and expansion of his discussion of empirical psychology in the lectures on metaphysics, and this part deals with psychological issues. That the metaphysical origin of the lectures remained important is shown by the fact that Kant continued to use as a basis for his lectures on anthropology the Psychologia Empirica, i.e., the third part of Baumgarten's Metaphysica. Previously he had used this part in the lectures on metaphysics to introduce psychological issues to his students; now he used it less in his lectures on metaphysics and more in his lectures on anthropology. As late as 1778 he explicitly pointed out to Herz that after having begun lecturing on anthropology he no longer treated empirical psychology extensively in his lectures on metaphysics, which suggests that he thought of anthropology as a replacement for that part of the lectures on metaphysics (10, p. 181).
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Part II bears the subtitle ''On the Way of Cognizing the Interior of the Human Being from the Exterior,'' but Kant also seems to have considered the subtitle ''By What is the Peculiarity of Each Human Being to be Cognized?'' and thought that the first part could be described as the doctrine of the elements of anthropology and the second as the doctrine of method (7, 299) . A similar division can be found in the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason, the Critique of Judgment, and the Metaphysics of Morals. If we were to take this seriously, then Part II would amount to an ''estimate of the building materials'' and the determination of their suitability ''for what sort of edifice, with what height and strength'' we may build (A707/B735). The second part would have less to do with the materials than with the blueprint for the building (or discipline). And this blueprint is a plan for the future of the human species. Unfortunately, the ''Doctrine of Method'' is even shorter in the Anthropology than it is in the other works mentioned above.
It is the notion of ''character'' which is of central importance for Kant and which plays a key role in the second part of the Anthropology. He deals with the character of individual human beings, the character of the sexes, the character of different peoples or nations and of different races, and ultimately the character of the human species. This part of the book has little to do with Baumgarten's Psychologia Empirica, but rather deals with issues relating to the final goal of human beings (die Bestimmung des Menschen). As such it belongs in the context of discussions by Thomas Abbt, Moses Mendelssohn, and Johann Joachim Spalding on the one hand, and of Kant's own writings on the philosophy of history and theology on the other. Repeating claims he defended in those writings, Kant says that ultimate moral achievement cannot be expected of any one individual, but only of the species as a whole. Morality and anthropology thus lead to political and historical considerations, to questions about what the ultimate destination of the human race is.
Furthermore, anthropology is for Kant a description not of human beings but of human nature. Even when we speak of the nature of the individual or of the ''character'' of an individual, we do not speak of his particular choices, but about his principles or maxims. An individual's nature cannot be reduced to that individual's choices. Indeed, the with ''anthroponomy'' at one point in his Metaphysics of Morals of 1798, saying that the former is merely empirical and cannot count as evidence against the latter, which ''is established by the absolute power of the law-giving reason'' (6, p. 406).
expression ''an individual's human nature'' would be an oxymoron for Kant (and for others besides him). But none of this is explicitly argued for or fully developed. Kant seems to want to refer his readers to the earlier essays and books which he had written about these subjects.
The Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View reads like a work in progress, not like a finished product. And it may just be that old ageKant had to stop lecturing in 1797, one year before the publication of the Anthropology -prevented a development that might have given rise to the ''complete anthropology'' that he had envisaged in the Critique of Pure Reason as being the true home of ''empirical psychology'' after it had been ''banned from metaphysics.'' This complete anthropology would have been ''the pendant to the empirical doctrine of nature.'' Unfortunately, Kant did not live long enough for this to happen, but we are fortunate to have access to other materials. The intentions and conclusions of these materials can be properly understood only if their background in Kant's teaching is taken into account, which is why it is important to say something about the relation of the published text to the lecture notes by Kant and his students. The notes show how Kant's thoughts on anthropology developed, and how this discipline relates to his philosophical system as a whole.
The relation of the published Anthropology to the lectures on anthropology
In the early 1770s Kant began to deliver his lectures on empirical psychology -which until then had formed part of his course on metaphysics -in a new course, entitled ''anthropology.'' The reason for this appears to be quite simple, and has to do with a radical change of his views on metaphysics in the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770. One of the most important new doctrines in this work was the radical distinction between ''intellect'' on the one hand and ''sensation'' on the other. Kant argued that these two faculties are independent and irreducible. They constitute sources of entirely different kinds of knowledge, namely the intellectual and the sensible. Because of this, he argued, we must assume two worlds, namely a mundus intelligibilis and a mundus sensibilis. Each of these worlds obeys its own principles and exhibits forms peculiar to it, and each of them has its own objects: ''The object of sensibility is the sensible, that which contains nothing but what is to be cognized through the intelligence is intelligible. In the schools of the ancients the former was called a phenomenon and the latter a noumenon'' (2, p. 393). Phenomena are ''representations of things as they appear,'' and noumena are ''representations of things as they are'' (2, p. 392). It would therefore be a serious mistake in his view if we were to regard sensibility as nothing but confused thinking, or thinking as nothing but distinct sensation (as Leibniz, Wolff, and most other moderns have done). To quote Kant's own words, ''the sensitive is poorly defined as that which is more confusedly cognized, and that which belongs to the understanding as that of which there is a distinct cognition. For these are only logical distinctions which do not touch at all the things given, which underlie every logical distinction'' (2, p. 395). Even if sensitive knowledge presupposes the use of certain concepts of the understanding, this use of the understanding is merely logical or formal. It is of secondary importance compared with the real use of the understanding by means of which ''the concepts themselves, whether of things, or relations, are given'' (2, p. 393).
Eleven years later, in his first Critique, Kant accused Leibniz and Locke in particular of having committed this error, saying that the former had ''intellectualised appearances,'' while the latter had ''sensualised all concepts of the understanding'' (A271/B327). In the Dissertation, however, he singles out for special criticism ''the illustrious Wolff,'' who ''has, by this distinction between what is sensitive and what belongs to the understanding, a distinction which for him is only logical, completely abolished, to the great detriment of philosophy, the noblest of the enterprises of antiquity, the determining of the character of phenomena and noumena . . . '' (2, p. 394) .
This implies that ''empirical psychology belongs just as little to metaphysics as empirical physics'' (28, p. 223). Metaphysics deals with ''conceptus puri or concepts which are either given purely through reason or whose knowledge has at least its source within human knowledge,'' whereas anthropology has to do with empirical concepts only. Even if these empirical concepts are to a large extent based on inner sense, they do not afford any rational knowledge of man (25, p. 243) . His first lecture course was therefore entitled ''Natural Knowledge of Man.'' Since the sharp division of reason and sensibility that characterizes the first lecture on anthropology and the excision of empirical psychology from metaphysics can be traced back to the changes that characterize the Inaugural Dissertation, we may also claim that these changes lead ultimately to Introduction xvii Kant's conception of anthropology as an empirical discipline of the knowledge of human beings.
It is well known that this new thesis of the radical discontinuity of sensibility and intellect is closely connected with another doctrine that makes its first appearance in this work, namely that of the subjectivity of space and time. What is generally overlooked, however, is that Kant's rejection of the continuity thesis also had immediate consequences for moral philosophy. As Kant himself points out in the Dissertation, the pure principles of the understanding or reason allow us to have the concept of an important ''paradigm.'' This paradigm is ''noumenal perfection,'' and ''noumenal perfection'' has two senses: it is ''perfection either in the theoretical sense or in the practical sense. In the former sense it is the Supreme Being, G O D; in the latter sense it is M O R A L P E R F E C T I O N. Moral philosophy, therefore, in so far as it furnishes the first principles of judgment, is cognized by the pure understanding and belongs only to pure philosophy'' (2, p. 396). Moral principles are intellectual and therefore cannot be reduced to sensibility. Pure moral metaphysics has just as little place for sensible concepts as has pure speculative metaphysics.
Kant argued from this time on that as well as metaphysics in the theoretical sense and metaphysics in the practical sense, we need an empirical physics, i.e., an empirical discipline concerned with the investigation of material objects, and an empirical psychology or anthropology. In the Inaugural Dissertation he believed that reason could secure the foundation of a universal moral theory in knowledge of things as they are in themselves, and he believed that we could obtain this knowledge through reason. It is thus not surprising that in the letter in which he first told Herz of his new lecture, he also speaks of moral philosophy, saying that the concept of ''reality'' should not be applied to morals because it pleasing in the highest degree. For it is no mere speculative idea; it must have the power to move. Therefore, though the highest ground of morality is intellectual, it must nevertheless have a direct relation to the primary springs of the will. (10, p. 145)
Even though Kant believed in 1773 that ''the highest ground of morality is intellectual,'' he also thought that it needed ''primary springs of the will,'' which were not intellectual. He takes this position also in the lectures on ethics delivered during the summer of 1775. We need both moral motivations and purely intellectual principles to judge whether an action is moral. There must be a principium diiudicationis that is objective, and a subjective principle that motivates us, a principium executionis that is related to human nature and sensibility.
Kant explicitly argues that the latter is to be found in a moral sense.
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And this is the domain of empirical psychology and is concerned with the ''sources of all the sciences that are concerned with morals, with the ability of commerce, and the method of educating and ruling human beings, or all that is practical'' (10, p. 145). Kant's anthropology originates thus from a new conception of the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morals. Both call for an empirical counterpart. Anthropology is to contain moral psychology or the discussion of ''the primary springs of the will.'' Though Kant's faith in the possibility of founding pure morality in purely rational knowledge of things in themselves dissipated as he developed the doctrines put forward in the first Critique of 1781, he continued to hold the view that moral philosophy had both a pure and an empirical part. Like the epistemic or metaphysical context, the moral context required both pure rational principles and sensible content.
Introduction is required of him . . . One can . . . consider practical philosophy even without anthropology, or without knowledge of the agent, only then it is merely speculative; so man must at least be studied accordingly. (27, p. 244) This is in stark contrast to the view Kant puts forward in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals of 1785, where he argued that the categorical imperative constituted both the principium diiudicationis and the principium executionis and relegated the moral sense or moral feeling to the periphery of moral philosophy.
This had important consequences for the role of anthropology in his system. While it was central in 1773 and 1775 because it concerned ''the primary springs of the will'' that he thought were not rational but rather part of our empirical nature, it became peripheral as soon as these primary springs themselves were conceived as rational. In 1775, Kant went so far as to argue that moral philosophy without anthropology was ''merely speculative'' and ''empty''; anthropology was needed in ethics in so far as ''ought'' must imply ''can'' and we must therefore first determine whether we can meet the demands that a purely rational morality makes on us (19, p. 137 -written around 1772). In 1785, he was convinced that anthropology and metaphysics of morals have nothing in common and should not be mixed. Because ''ought'' implies ''can,'' we are ''obligated.'' ''Practical anthropology'' is no longer part of morals proper. The task was to work out a ''pure moral philosophy, completely cleansed of everything that may be empirical and that belongs to anthropology' ' (4, pp. 388f.) .
We may therefore say that the moral relevance of the lectures on anthropology decreased as Kant's thought on moral issues developed. It may appear that after 1785 anthropology lost all importance for morals proper, because all moral concepts have their seat and origin completely a priori in reason . . . Just in this purity of their origin lies their dignity, so that they can serve us as supreme practical principles, that in adding anything empirical to them one subtracts just as much from their genuine influence and from the unlimited worth of actions . . . it is of the greatest practical importance not to make its principles dependent upon the special nature of human reason . . . just because moral laws are to hold for every rational being as such.
Morality needs anthropology only ''for its application to human beings,'' not for morality itself (4, pp. 411f.) But ''all moral philosophy is based entirely on its pure part; and it does not borrow in the least thing from acquaintance with mankind (from anthropology)'' (4, p. 389). Partly as a result of this, the pragmatic dimension of anthropology, which had always been important, now became the most important concern of anthropology, something that is borne out by the very title of the published Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.
But what does ''pragmatic'' mean? While this is not the place to trace the details of the development of the term in Kant's thinking, it is worth pointing out that its meaning also undergoes some change, and that this change roughly corresponds to the change in Kant's conception of moral motivation. First of all, there is a sense of ''pragmatic'' that concerns a certain way of writing history, namely a non-scholastic way that indicates writing not just for the academy but for a broader public. It is roughly equivalent to ''popular'' as opposed to ''academic'' and remains constant in all of Kant's writings. But this is not the sense of ''pragmatic'' which is primarily relevant in anthropological and moral contexts. More important is the sense that has to do with ''motivation.'' Around 1773 ''pragmatic'' meant ''what moves the will'' or is an ''incentive'' (Triebfeder) that ''corresponds to a rule' ' (15, p. 516) . Differentiating between ''impulse'' (Antrieb), which is subjective and pathological, on the one hand, and objective, ''motiva,'' on the other, Kant characterized the motives as either ''pragmatic or moral,'' and asserted that even the ''pragmatic imperatives are categorical '' (19, p. 104) . ''Pragmatic'' and ''moral'' do not exclude one another at this point. This changes in 1785. From then on, ''pragmatic'' imperatives are for Kant always ''conditioned'' and ''hypothetical,'' and only moral imperatives are categorical. He now worries about ''mistaking the pragmatic for the moral' ' (19, p. 93) . Pragmatic imperatives concern rules of prudence. And rules of prudence concern mainly the use we can make of other people to achieve our own ends, or the means of obtaining our own happiness. They are thus in Kant's mature philosophy essentially at cross-purposes with the fundamental duties of virtue. Given the sharp contrast between anything that is prudential and what is truly moral in Kant's mature ethics, pragmatic considerations are per se non-moral.
To sum up, in 1773 ''pragmatic'' meant for Kant ''everything that pertains to the practical,'' but at least since 1785 it indicated everything that pertains to the practical, except what is purely moral. This can also be seen from Kant's description of the relationship between pure morals and moral anthropology in the Metaphysics of Morals, the only passage in all of his published works in which he uses the expression ''moral anthropology'':
The counterpart of a metaphysics of morals, the other member of the division of practical philosophy . . . would be moral anthropology, which, however, would deal only with the subjective conditions in human nature that hinder or help us in fulfilling the laws of the metaphysics of morals. It would deal with the development, spreading, and strengthening of moral principles (in education through schools and popular instruction), and with other similar teachings and precepts based on experience. It cannot be dispensed with, but it must neither precede it nor be mixed with it, for one would then run the risk of bringing forth false or at least indulgent moral laws that would misrepresent as unattainable what is not attained just because the law has not been presented in all its purity (which constitutes its very strength) or because false and impure incentives were used in addition to it in itself in accordance with duty and good. This would leave no certain moral principles as a guide for judging or disciplining the mind in the observance of duty, the precepts of which must be given a priori by pure reason alone. (6, p. 217) ''Pragmatic'' in the title of the published Anthropology cannot include the strictly ''moral'' dimension. Kant says that part of what Kant intends to deal with in the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Even if there is perhaps some overlap between the pragmatic anthropology and the projected moral anthropology, this overlap is not very great. So where is the moral anthropology Kant envisaged?
The answer to this question is easy, for, strictly speaking, it does not exist. Kant clearly never completed it. There is no book or article in which he explicitly sets himself that task and tackles it directly. Still, there are beginnings. We might look for hints in the place where Kant talks most explicitly about both the moral law and human nature, namely the ''Doctrine of Virtue'' in the Metaphysics of Morals, where he claims that ''virtue'' is the point at which morality makes contact with human nature. This is interesting, as ''virtue'' or Tugend does not play a significant role in Kant's Groundwork, and while it is important in the discussion of the postulates in the Critique of Practical Reason, even there it is not an explicit topic of discussion. Even though Kant claims that ''virtue is the greatest that finite practical reason can achieve'' (5, p. 33), he does not pursue the topic any further. This is no accident, since virtue is for Kant not a topic of pure moral philosophy, which is concerned with reason in general. Virtue is of the greatest importance for a specific kind of reason, namely our own reason. It concerns morality ''applied'' to human beings. Kant makes this very clear in the early lectures on moral philosophy, where he argues that a doctrine of virtue cannot capture moral philosophy as a whole:
Ethics explained by a doctrine of virtue is good inasmuch as virtue belongs solely to the inner tribunal; but since virtue entails not just morally good actions, but at the same time the possibility of the opposite, and thus incorporates an inner struggle, this is therefore too narrow a concept, since we can also ascribe ethics, but not virtue (properly speaking) to the angels and to God, for in them there is assuredly holiness but not virtue. (27, p. 13) 
